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Abstract
In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the e¤ectiveness of incentives.
We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true
performance di¤erence between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the
standard approach, rational agents should completely disregard the performance feedback
of self-interested principals and choose their e¤ort level as if they had not been given any
information. However, despite substantial underreporting many principals seem to exhibit
lying aversion which renders their feedback informative. Therefore, the agents respond
to the feedback but discount it strongly by reducing their e¤ort relative to fully truthful
performance feedback. Moreover, previous experiences of being deceived exacerbate the
problem and eventually reduce average e¤ort even below the level that prevails in the
absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for
incentives than biased feedback.
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Distortion or inaccuracy in performance appraisal is nothing more than good
management. Manager who shamelessly manipulate the performance appraisal sys-
tem to achieve their primary goals (i.e., get the most possible out of the human
and physical resources at their disposal) do more for their organizations than man-
agers who follow all of the rules and who turn in accurate performance appraisals,
regardless of the consequences.
Murphy & Cleveland (1995, p. 348)
1 Introduction
Incentives are pervasive in economic life. Without proper incentives economic exchange and
production will be suboptimal. Deliberate incentive design intends to shape and enhance agents
performance and rests, therefore, always on some sort of performance appraisal. However, as the
above quote from the famous performance appraisal textbook by Murphy and Cleveland (1995)
indicates, principals often face the temptation to manipulate and bias performance appraisals.
In fact, these authors strongly endorse biased performance appraisals and there is evidence that
managers indeed provide untruthful performance feedback.1
In this paper we document that biased performance appraisals may thoroughly undermine
incentives. We show that even quite subtle forms of deceit can be detrimental for incentives.
It is obvious that incentives break down if promised payments are not delivered although the
agent performed well. However, here we show that deceitful principals undermine incentives
even if they cannot manipulate the payments to the agents, that is, even if the agents are
correctly paid according to their output performance.
In order to study the impact of deception on incentives we examine behavior in a dynamic
tournament. Tournaments are ubiquitious in economic organizations because performance is
often rewarded by promoting high-performing employees. Such tournaments are inherently
dynamic as during the contest the principal often observes some interim performance measures
that she can use to provide feedback to the agents. In these settings the principals often face
strong incentives to provide wrong or misleading feedback. Based on a simple two-stage model of
a dynamic tournament with two competing agents we show that the agents provide higher e¤ort
in the second stage of the tournament if the absolute output di¤erence between the agents after
the rst stage is smaller. This result is intuitive as agents whose interim output performance is
1Longecker, Sims and Gioia (1987), for example, interviewed 60 upper-level executive and found evidence of
deliberate manipulation of formal performance appraisal ratings by executives. Executives adjusted or manipu-
lated employee ratings in order to accomplish their own goals or agendas, most often in an attempt to increase
performance by employees.
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closer to each other have a stronger incentive for subsequent performance because the likelihood
of winning the overall tournament is still high for both of them. Therefore, if the performance
di¤erence is not directly observable to the agents a self-interested principal has an incentive to
report smaller than actual output di¤erences to the agents.2
We examined the prediction that agentse¤ort after feedback is decreasing in the absolute
output di¤erence by conducting a laboratory experiment with truthful information feedback
(the Truthful Feedback condition, TF), that is, the agents knew that they received correct
feedback information after the rst stage of the tournament. The actual e¤ort behavior in
this treatment is remarkably close to the prediction of the above model. Thus, based on this
result, we know that if principals are free to provide false feedback they face an incentive to
underreport the actual output di¤erences because this increases the e¤ort of gullible agents.
However, rational agents will anticipate the principalsincentive to underreport and, therefore,
treat the principalsfeedback information as completely uninformative.3
Thus, if agents are rational and the principalsmessages are indeed completely uninformative
we have a stark prediction: in a condition in which the principals provide feedback, the agents
e¤ort is identical to a condition in which the agents receive no feedback at all. In other words,
the principalsmessages are without any consequences on e¤ort. In order to test this prediction
we conducted two further treatments: a treatment in which the principals were free to choose
the feedback information (the Principal Feedback treatment, PF) and a treatment without any
information feedback after the rst stage (the No Feedback treatment, NF). We deliberately
chose the parameters of the experiment in such a way that the equilibrium e¤ort in the second
stage of the NF treatment is higher than the average e¤ort after feedback in the equilibrium
of the TF treatment. This means that if the cheap talk hypothesis holds, the agents in the PF
condition should provide a higher average e¤ort after feedback than in the TF condition.
In sharp contrast to the cheap talk hypothesis, the feedback by the principals was informative
and had a sizeable negative e¤ect on the agentse¤ort choices. However, as the principals also
frequently sent false feedback the agents strongly discounted the principalsmessages: when a
principal reported an absolute output di¤erence of  the agents behaved as if the true output
di¤erence is not  but k with k > 1. Therefore, for any given output di¤erence reported by a
2As employeesperformance is often di¢ cult to assess, representing a combination of many soft factors
such as communication and team leadership performance, innovativeness, initiative and originality, the princi-
pals assessment of these factors will nally decide the outcome of the tournament. It is therefore often the
case that the principals are better informed about performance and, in particular, performance di¤erences
among employees than the employees themselves. In addition, employees may su¤er from self-serving biases in
their performance assessment which renders balanced assessments of employee performance by human resource
departments even more important.
3We call this in the following the cheap talk hypothesisbecause in our setting the fact that talk is cheap
implies that all communication among self-interested players is uninformative.
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principal in the PF treatment, the agents provided much less e¤ort compared to the e¤ort level
they chose in response to truthfully reported output di¤erences in the TF treatment. This e¤ort
response to principalsmessages also had implications for average e¤ort levels after feedback.
Despite the fact that the agents in the PF treatment face a much higher frequency of small
reported output di¤erences their average e¤ort after feedback is eventually even lower than in
the TF and the NF treatment because the agents discount the principals information quite
strongly.
One driving force behind these e¤ort patterns is the fact that principalsmessages were
not merely cheap talk, that is, they were partially informative. Some principals provided
feedback that was close to the truth while others reported consistently much smaller output
di¤erences than the actual ones. On average, an increase in the reported output di¤erence by
one unit was associated with a true increase in the output di¤erence by two units. Therefore,
it was rational for the agents to respond to variations in the reported output di¤erences in the
PF condition even more strongly than to variations in truthful output di¤erences in the TF
condition. Interestingly, this is exactly what we observe in these conditions.
The negative e¤ect of deceitful messages on e¤ort was not limited to the post-feedback stage.
Over time the agentsaverage e¤ort in the PF condition even declines in the pre-feedback stage,
indicating a pervasive negative e¤ect of principalsdeceitful messages on the overall e¤ort level.
This e¤ect seems to be driven by the frequency of deceitful messages that an agent has received:
agents who faced a higher frequency of small reported output di¤erences in past interactions
were signicantly more likely to choose a low e¤ort level even in the pre-feedback period of a
tournament. This nding indicates a more general undermining of incentives through deception
because, as we show in the paper, a rational agents rst stage e¤ort should not be a¤ected by
the expectation that a principal sends false feedback about the rst stage output di¤erence.
In the nal part of the paper we show that a model of lying aversion provides a plausible
explanation for many key features in our data. This model assumes a heterogeneous population
of lying averse subjects: some subjects are assumed to have higher psychic costs of lying than
others. The assumption of heterogeneous lying aversion is supported by previous work of
Gneezy (2005), Mazar and Ariely (2006) and Sanchez-Pages & Vorsatz (2007) which provides
evidence for heterogeneous preferences for truth-telling. Heterogeneity is also supported by our
nding that strongly Machiavellian subjects, that is, subjects with a high degree of selshness
and opportunism, lie signicantly more compared to subjects that score low on the Machiavelli
scale.
Principals who exhibit some degree of lying aversion are willing to report the truth if the
costs of truth-telling are not too large. In our setting the costs of truth-telling arise because
principals who report a lower output di¤erence to the agents will on average induce a higher
second stage performance in the tournament. Empirically it turns out that if the true output
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di¤erence is already smallthe benets of reporting an even smaller output di¤erence are small.
Thus, for small true output di¤erences a model based on heterogeneous principals predicts a
higher frequency of truth-telling, which is indeed the case. Furthermore, the existence of lying
averse principals makes it rational for the agents to attribute some informative content to the
principalsmessages while the existence of principals with little or no lying aversion renders it
rational to discount the message of a principal partially because the agent in the experiment
does not know what principal he faces in a given period. Thus, the partial informativeness
of the principalsmessages and the subsequent response of the agents follows directly from
heterogeneity in lying aversion and the assumption that agents behave rationally.
Finally, heterogeneous lying aversion can also explain why agents who experienced deceitful
messages more often, provide lower second stage e¤ort than agents who experience fewer deceit-
ful messages. A plausible reason for this fact is that agents who experience deceitful messages
more often have less trust in the principals, that is, they update the probability that they face
a deceitful principal. As a consequence, they discount the principals feedback information more
strongly and provide a lower e¤ort for a given reported output di¤erence. We believe that
this feature in our data captures an important e¤ect that is also likely to be relevant in real
organizations.
It is ironic that the negative impact of the PF treatment on e¤ort is based on the fact
that some principals also send messages that are correct or close to the truth. If the principals
messages had been completely unreliable it would have made no sense for the agents to take the
principalsmessages seriously not even in a discounted way. In this case it would have been
rational to completely disregard principalsmessages and choose the same high second stage
e¤ort as in the NF treatment. Thus, we observe here an interesting non-monotonous e¤ect of
feedback information on tournament incentives: no information or completely uninformative
feedback and fully truthful information is better than partially informative feedback. This
nding may explain a stylized fact from the organizational behavior literature, namely, that
performance feedback is often quite uninformative (Meyer, Kay & French (1965), Beer (1987),
Gibbs (1991)). In view of the di¢ culty of forcing managers to provide truthful performance
feedback to the employees it might be better to provide no or merely uninformative feedback.
Our paper is related to the theoretical and experimental literature on the e¢ ciency and ef-
fectiveness of tournament incentives (Lazear & Rosen (1981), Lizzeri, Meyer & Persico (1999),
Aoyagi (2004), Ederer (2005), Bull, Schotter & Weigelt (1987), Schotter & Weigelt (1992),
Harbring, Irlenbusch, Kräkel & Selten (forthcoming)). However, none of these papers provides
an empirical examination of the impact of principalslying incentives on e¤ort provision in a
dynamic tournament. Our paper is also related to the seminal theoretical work of Crawford
& Sobel (1982) and Crawford (2003) on strategic information transmission and experimental
work on sender-receiver games where the interests of the sender and the receiver of a message
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are in conict (e.g., Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995), Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle
(1998)). Central aspects of Crawford & Sobels theory of information transmission have found
strong support in papers such as Cai & Wang (2006), Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2006) and
Sanchez-Pages & Vorsatz (2007). One intriguing empirical nding in these papers concerns
overcommunication by the senders, i.e., the fact that the sendersmessages are too informative
about the true state of the world relative to the equilibrium with rational and self-interested
players. Moreover, the work of Sanchez-Pages & Vorsatz (2007) suggests that this overcommu-
nication is at least partly driven by preferences for truth-telling.
None of the above papers examines the impact of strategic information transmission on the
e¤ectiveness of performance incentives. We are also not aware of any other work that compares
agentse¤ort behavior in situations where they receive no information about the state of the
world, fully truthful information and information that can be biased because it comes from
an interested principal. It is the comparison between these three situations which enables us
to identify the extent to which deceitful messages undermine incentives for e¤ort provision.
The impact of deception on e¤ort provision is so pervasive that it does not only change the
agentsdirect e¤ort response to the performance feedback at the second stage of the tournament
but it also causes a large decline in rst stage e¤ort levels, supporting the conclusion that no
performance feedback as well as truthful performance feedback is superior to an arrangement
where the principal is not constrained to tell the truth.
In view of the profound e¤ects of heterogenous preferences for honesty in our setting we
believe that contract theory and, more generally, economics could benet from taking these
preferences into account. There is a large class of economic problems that are characterized
by lying incentives and as our results suggest heterogenous preferences for honesty may a¤ect
behavior in these situations in important ways.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a model of the e¤ect
of interim information and communication in dynamic tournaments. Section 3 describes the
experiment and Section 4 presents the experimental results which we interpret in Section 5.
4For example, a used car salesman has an incentive to lie about the quality of the car he is attempting to
sell (Akerlof 1970) or a regulated rm has an incentive to claim high costs in order to receive higher transfer
payments (La¤ont & Tirole 1993). In the absence of reputation incentives nancial brokers will be tempted to
recommend stocks or funds that further their own interests but not necessarily the clientsinterests (Davis 2004)
and tax payers have an incentive to underreport their income. (Allingham & Sandmo 1972). Similarly, in the
insurance market the insured parties have incentives to overstate the value of claims to insurance companies.
In all these cases, economic models typically assumed that a player lies whenever it is in his or her economic
interest to do so. However, the existence of heterogeneous lying aversion may, for example, change the optimal
insurance contract because insurance companies may want to induce self-selection of liers and honest people into
di¤erent contracts. Likewise, employers may want to screen people for special jobs on the basis of the strength
of an employees lying aversion.
6
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains additional proofs and Appendix B proposes a simple
model of lying aversion. Appendix C shows that alternative social preference theories cannot
explain the experimental results.
2 A Simple Model of Dynamic Tournaments
In this section we present a model of dynamic tournaments when there is no feedback (NF),
when feedback is truthful (TF) and when principals have the opportunity to provide wrong
feedback (PF). For additional technical details and less restrictive modeling assumptions the
reader is referred to Ederer (2005).
Consider a tournament for a xed prize between two risk-neutral agents i = A;B which
takes place over 2 stages, t = 1; 2. The utility of winning the contest is P and the utility
of losing is p. Agent is output in stage t is given by xit = e
i
t + "
i
t where e
i
t is the privately
chosen e¤ort level and "it is an error term. At the end of stage 2, the principal aggregates the
scores from both stages to determine the winner of the contest. Agent A wins the contest if his
accumulated output is greater than that of agent B, i.e. if xA1 + x
A
2 > x
B
1 + x
B
2 agent A wins
and agent B wins if the reverse inequality holds.
Each agents e¤ort eit is his private information and is not observed by the other contestant.
We assume that the noise di¤erence "At  "Bt is independently normally distributed for each t with
cumulative density function F () and density f(). Let G() and g() denote the distribution
and density functions of the sum of the noise di¤erences "A1   "B1 + "A2   "B2 . Note that the
noise di¤erence in each stage and thus the sum of noise di¤erences in both stages are normally
distributed, i.e.,
"At   "Bt  N(0; 2)
"A1   "B1 + "A2   "B2  N(0; 22):
When exerting e¤ort in stage t agent i incurs a cost c(eit). The payo¤ to agent i is given by
U i = p+ (P   p) Pr(xi1 + xi2 > xj1 + xj2)  c(ei1)  c(ei2): (1)
We intend to contrast the following three settings: no feedback, truthful feedback and
feedback by self-interested principals. In the no feedback scenario, neither of the agents knows
the rst stage output di¤erence  when choosing second stage e¤ort. The rst stage output
di¤erence is dened in the following way:
  xA1   xB1 = eA1 + "A1   eA1   "B1 :
In the truthful feedback scenario, the rst stage output di¤erence  is truthfully revealed to
the two contestants. Hence, each agent learns the rst stage outcome  before choosing second
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stage e¤orts. Finally, in the last scenario feedback is given to the agents by self-interested
principals who do not face any truth-telling restrictions. This third case falls between the
two polar opposites of no feedback and truthful feedback. When the feedback the agents
receive from principals is completely uninformative then rational agents will behave as in the
no feedback setting, whereas when it is fully informative they will choose e¤orts as in the
truthful feedback scenario. As we shall see, the predictions for e¤ort choice when agents do not
receive any feedback are identical to those when feedback is given by self-interested principals
since feedback is completely uninformative in the latter setting.
We denote equilibrium e¤ort by e, ~e and e^ when agents receive no feedback, truthful
feedback and feedback from principals, respectively.
2.1 Dynamic Tournaments without Feedback
The probability of winning the contest for a given level of e¤ort choices is G(). Therefore the
maximization of equation (1) is tantamount to the maximization of
p+ (P   p)G(ei1 + ei2   ej1   ej2)  c(ei1)  c(ei2):
The resulting rst order condition with respect to eit for an interior solution for both stages is
given by
c0(eit) = (P   p)g(ei1 + ei2   ej1   ej2):
In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game this condition simplies to
c0(e) = (P   p)g(0): (2)
Since the sum of the noise di¤erences is normally distributed according to N(0; 22), the e¤ort
in both stages of the NF condition is given by
c0(e) =
P   p
2
p

: (3)
2.2 Dynamic Tournaments with Truthful Feedback
2.2.1 Second Stage
At the beginning of the second stage agent i knows the rst stage output di¤erence  so that
his overall utility can be written as
U i = p+ (P   p)F (ei2   ej2 +)  c(ei2)
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where F (ei2 ej2+) is the probability of winning the contest for given second stage e¤ort levels
and a given output di¤erence . In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the second stage each
agent i chooses ei2 such that
@U i
@ei2
= 0 which yields the following rst order condition
c0(~e2) = (P   p)f(): (4)
Since the second stage error di¤erence is normally distributed the e¤ort in the second stage of
the TF condition is given by
c0(~e2) =
P   p

p
2
exp
"
 1
2



2#
: (5)
Equation (5) implies that the second stage equilibrium e¤ort is decreasing in the absolute
magnitude of the rst stage output di¤erence . When the di¤erence between the two agents
is large, the intensity of competition is low and thus the e¤ort of both agents is low while e¤ort
is high when agentsoutputs in the rst stage are close to each other.
2.2.2 First Stage
Having determined the equilibrium e¤ort choice of the second stage we can solve for the agents
e¤ort choice in the rst stage. Agent i chooses ei1 to maximize
U i = p+ (P   p)G(ei1 + ~ei2   ej1   ~ej2)  c(ei1)  E

c(~ei2)

where the second stage e¤ort levels ~ei2 and ~e
j
2 depend on . Note that the rst stage e¤ort e
i
1
a¤ects the agents utility U i in three ways. First, there is a direct e¤ect of ei1 on U
i because a
higher ei1 increases the probability of winning and increases the rst stage cost of e¤ort. Second,
a higher ei1 changes  which in turn changes the second stage equilibrium e¤ort ~e
i
2 according
to equation (5). Finally, a higher ei1 also a¤ects the opponents e¤ort choice ~e
j
2 because j also
responds to the change in  with a change in ~ej2. Thus, agent is rst order condition can be
written as
dU i
dei1
=
@U i
@ei1
+
@U i
@~ei2
d~ei2
dei1
+
@U i
@~ej2
d~ej2
dei1
: (6)
The second term in equation (6) is zero because for any given output di¤erence agent i chooses
the utility maximizing level of ~ei2 so that
@U i
@~ei2
= 0. It turns out that because of the symmetry of
the normal distribution and the symmetry of the equilibrium the third term in equation (6) is
also zero. Since the proof of this assertion involves some cumbersome manipulations we relegate
it to Appendix A (see also Ederer (2005)). Thus, as the second and the third term in equation
(6) are zero we are left with
@U i
@ei1
= (P   p)g(ei1 + ~ei2   ej1   ~ej2)  c0(ei1)
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which simplies in the symmetric equilibrium to
c0(~e1) = (P   p)g(0): (7)
2.2.3 Comparison
From the rst order conditions (2) and (7) it follows that rst stage e¤orts under the NF and
the TF condition are equal, i.e., e = ~e1. Due to the symmetric e¤ort choice of the two agents
in the rst stage of the TF condition, equation (5) for second stage e¤ort in the TF condition
reduces to
c0(~e2) =
P   p

p
2
exp
"
 1
2

"A1   "B1

2#
: (8)
Equation (8) shows that second stage e¤ort under truthful feedback, contrary to all other
previous e¤ort choices, is random. When  = "A1   "B1 = 0, the exponent of the right-hand side
of (8) is zero and thus second stage e¤ort ~e2 is highest at this point. Furthermore, at  = 0
second stage e¤ort ~e2 is higher than e as can be seen from comparing the right-hand sides of
equations (8) and (3).
In Appendix A we further show that expected second stage e¤ort under the TF condition
is equal to e¤ort in the NF condition, E [~e2] = e, if the cost of e¤ort is quadratic (and
marginal cost is linear), E [~e2] > e if marginal cost is concave and E [~e2] < e if marginal
cost is convex. Intuitively, the convexity of marginal costs implies that due to the variability of
output di¤erences the expected marginal costs for second stage e¤ort would be higher in the TF
condition compared to the NF condition if the agent chose rst and second stage e¤ort levels
that are equal in expectation. However, in equilibrium marginal costs of rst and second stage
e¤ort are equalized and therefore E [~e2] is below e. This result is important for our purposes
because in our experiments we implemented convex marginal cost of e¤ort, which implies that
the average second stage e¤ort under truthful feedback, E [~e2] is predicted to be lower than the
second stage e¤ort under no feedback e.
Our analysis above shows that the rst stage e¤ort under no feedback (NF) and under
truthful feedback (TF) are identical, i.e., the fact that agents receive information about the
rst stage output di¤erence does not a¤ect rst stage e¤orts. Aoyagi (2004) shows that this
result holds more generally, in particular, for the case where feedback information about  is
only partially informative. That is, the equality of rst stage e¤orts does not only hold for the
two extreme cases of full information and no information feedback, but also for all intermediate
cases of information release.
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2.3 Dynamic Tournaments with Feedback by Self-interested Princi-
pals
Consider the introduction of a risk-neutral self-interested principal. The principals role is to
transmit information about the output di¤erence between the two contestants after the rst
stage. Her period payo¤s are a linear function of the two contestantsoutputs in both stages
minus the wage costs for the two agents, that is, her payo¤ is given by
UP = 
 
xA1 + x
B
1 + x
A
2 + x
B
2
  P   p;
where  is a positive constant and it is commonly known that  > 0.
The principal observes the rst stage output di¤erence of the two contestants and must
then send a private message ^i to each agent i about the output di¤erence. We assume that
the principals message is non-veriable and the principal is not obliged to report truthfully
to either of the agents. Since the principals message does not a¤ect her utility function the
message is cheap talk (Crawford & Sobel 1982).
For the principal feedback scenario we denote equilibrium e¤ort by e^ and reports to agent
i of the output di¤erence by ^i.
2.3.1 Communication and E¤ort Equilibrium
In the above setting for all  > 0 the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a babbling equi-
librium in which all messages sent to the agents by the principal are uninformative. To see
this, consider the case where agents (naively) believe the principals message. In this case, the
optimal message is ^i = 0 because according to equation (5) this maximizes the agents e¤ort.
More generally, for any given belief the agents hold about the principals message the principal
will want to send the message that leads the agent to believe that the absolute value of the
output di¤erence is as low as possible as this will maximize the agents e¤ort. As a result, for
any given rst stage output di¤erence  the reported output di¤erence is independent of the
actual output di¤erence. Hence, all communication is uninformative and no information is
transmitted in equilibrium.
Note that the present model does not make clear predictions as to what messages will
actually be sent in equilibrium. As communication is completely uninformative all messages
will be ignored by agents. That is, regardless which messages principals send they will not
inuence agentse¤ort choices and so the messages sent by principals are indeterminate.
Furthermore, since the communication by principals is completely uninformative, agents
ignore the messages. As a result, with regards to e¤ort choice the model reduces to the no
feedback setting analyzed in Section 2.1.
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3 An Experimental Approach for the Study of Dishon-
esty and Incentives
The ideal data set for studying the e¤ects of dishonesty on incentives and e¤ort choices is based
on a truly exogenous ceteris paribus variation in the degree of credibility of information. The
exogenous variation allows the researcher to make causal inferences on the impact of di¤erent
degrees of information credibility. Such a data set permits, for instance, the examination of how
the possibility of dishonest reporting behavior a¤ects communication behavior of principals and
the e¤ort choices of contestants. The problem is, however, that it seems almost impossible to
nd or generate eld data to approximate this ideal data set. In real life situations, there are
few completely truthful or untruthful signals and one rarely knows how credible a given piece of
information is. Thus, it is particularly di¢ cult to measure and analyze the e¤ects of deception
on incentives and e¤ort provision. Experiments designed suitably allow for causal inferences,
however because one can implement exogenous ceteris paribus variations in the extent of in-
formation manipulation thus overcoming some of the measurement and endogeneity problems
present in the eld data. In particular, the following experiment allows us to study behavior
in the three settings where agents do not receive any feedback, where they receive completely
truthful feedback and where the feedback they receive can be manipulated by principals.
3.1 Experiment Design
We implemented the following three treatment conditions in order to examine how dishonesty
a¤ects communication and e¤ort choices. In the rst condition, which we call the no feedback
condition (NF condition), the contestants were given no information about rst stage outcomes
before the second stage. In the second condition, which we call the truthful feedback condition
(TF condition), the experimenter exogenously enforced truthful feedback about the rst stage
to the contestants and the subjects were informed about this. In the third condition, which we
call the principal feedback condition (PF condition), feedback about the rst stage was given
by principals to the contestants; principals observed outcomes in the rst stage and had to send
non-veriable messages about the rst stage output levels and the output di¤erence separately
and privately to each agent. The principals were free to report any output level and output
di¤erence irrespective of the actual outcomes and the agents knew this. Thus the design of
the experiment was chosen in such a way as to analyze di¤erences in behavior resulting from
di¤erences in information transmission.
By comparing e¤ort choices across the NF and TF conditions the e¤ect of credible in-
formation on e¤ort choices can be examined. Furthermore, these two conditions provide the
benchmarks against which the outcomes of PF condition can be measured. Our major re-
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search questions are addressed by analyzing communication behavior in the PF condition and
by comparing e¤ort choices across the PF, TF and NF conditions.
There were 15 periods in each of the three conditions. In all conditions the subjects were
anonymously and randomly matched at the beginning of each period. Each period had two
stages. In stage 1, workers chose their rst stage e¤orts ei1. After choosing e¤ort e
i
1, a normally
distributed random variable "i1 was added to each agents e¤ort choice. An agents rst stage
output xi1 was the sum of his e¤ort choice e
i
1 and the realization of his random variable "
i
1.
After the end of the rst stage, in the PF condition principals received information about the
rst stage output levels and the output di¤erence between the agents. The principals privately
sent information about the rst stage output levels and the output di¤erence to each of the two
agents they were paired with. Before the beginning of the second stage of the TF and the PF
condition, each contestant received information about his own rst stage output xi1, the rst
stage output of his opponent xj1 and the associated output di¤erence. In the TF condition this
information was relayed to each agent directly and truthfully through the computer, whereas
it was sent by a principal in the PF condition. The agents in the PF condition knew that the
principal could only determine the feedback they received about rst stage outcomes and that
she could neither determine the overall outcome of the tournament nor inuence the allocation
of prizes. This allocation was objectively determined by a comparison of the agentsactual
total output in the two stages in all three conditions. Contestants in the NF condition did not
receive any feedback about the rst stage.
In stage 2, contestants in all conditions had to choose their second stage e¤ort levels ei2 to
which another random variable "i2 was added to produce the agents second stage output x
i
2. At
the end of the second stage each agent received truthful feedback from the computer about the
sum of his own rst and second stage output level and the output sum of the other contestant.
In addition, each agent was informed about who received the higher prize P . This allowed
the agents to verify the validity and fairness of the prize allocation process. Since the agents
received information about the sum of outputs rather than about the separate outputs in each
stage they could only imperfectly infer the truthfulness of the principals previous report about
stage 1 outputs in the PF condition. Each principal received information about the agents
output levels in both stages and her own prot at the end of the second stage.
3.2 Parameters, Procedures, and Subject Pool
The material payo¤ of a contestant i was given by
U i =
(
P   c(ei1)  c(ei2)
p  c(ei1)  c(ei2)
if xi1 + x
i
2 > x
j
1 + x
j
2
if xi1 + x
i
2 < x
j
1 + x
j
2:
13
The material payo¤ of a principal was given by
UP = (xi1 + x
i
2 + x
j
1 + x
j
2)  P   p:
The set of feasible e¤ort levels was given by e 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 100g. The exact parameter values
and theoretical predictions are shown in Table 1. The parameter values were chosen so that the
equilibrium e¤ort choice did not constitute an immediate focal point such as 50 or the socially
e¢ cient e¤ort level 52.38. According to the design parameters the equilibrium e¤ort in the
NF condition, e, equals 37 in both stages. The same equilibrium e¤ort prevails in the rst
stage of the TF condition. Furthermore, as we implemented convex marginal costs, the average
equilibrium e¤ort in the second stage of the TF condition, ~e2, is lower than the equilibrium
e¤ort in stage 2 of the NF and PF condition.
Insert Table 1 here.
The agentspayo¤ function, the number of contestants and principals, the exact parame-
terization and the fact that there were 15 periods were common knowledge. However, in order
to avoid vertical fairness comparisons between the principals and the agents, the agents only
had qualitative information about the principalspayo¤ function, i.e., they did not know the
value of . Agents only knew that the principalspayo¤ was increasing in the e¤ort exerted by
them, but they did not know how much the principal earned. We implemented this procedure
because we were not interested in the potential impact of vertical fairness (payo¤) comparisons;
instead we wanted to study the impact of di¤erent information transmission mechanisms on
the agentsbehavior.
The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). A total of 192 subjects participated in our experiments. We conducted four sessions
in each condition giving us a total of 16 matching groups which constituted the independent
units of observation. A session lasted, on average, 75 minutes. Subjects were science students
from the University of Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. During the
experiment experimental currency units (ECU) were used to keep track of monetary earnings.
The exchange rate was set at 100 ECU = 1 CHF. On average, a subject earned CHF 43.40
($36) in an experimental session.
3.3 Predictions
Our experiment allows us to test the empirical predictions of the model presented in Section 2;
we can test, in particular, the e¤ort predictions implied by the model. These predictions follow
from the optimizing behavior of self-interested agents and principals and are discussed below.
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The rst hypothesis concerns second stage e¤ort which should respond to feedback about
the rst stage output di¤erence.
Feedback Hypothesis: In the second stage of the TF condition e¤ort is decreasing in the
absolute magnitude of the rst stage output di¤erence .
The predictions of the feedback hypothesis are similar to the predictions of a tournament in
which one contestant has an absolute output advantage over his opponent. Since the density
of the noise di¤erence is highest at 0 (see the right-hand side of equation (5)), the greater is
the advantage of one contestant the weaker are the incentives for e¤ort, and hence the lower
should be the equilibrium e¤ort choices of both contestants. Note that if agents behave similar
to this prediction in the PF condition, principals should have a strong incentive to misreport,
as higher e¤ort can be elicited by reporting an output di¤erence that is small in absolute value.
Based on the lying incentive for principals, we can now predict and analyze behavior in the
PF condition where interim information is given by principals.
Cheap Talk Hypothesis: In the PF condition communication by the principals does not
inuence the agentse¤ort choice, i.e., the agents behave in the same way as in the NF condi-
tion.
It is crucial for the cheap talk hypothesis that agents know that principals are rational and
selsh. When this is the case, the contestants in the PF condition realize that the rst stage
output di¤erences that principals report, only serve to elicit higher e¤ort levels from contestants
regardless of the actual rst stage output di¤erences. As a result, rational agents understand
that messages are completely uninformative and therefore they should behave as in the NF
condition.
Finally, based on the model in Section 2 and for the given experimental parameters (see
Table 1) we can stipulate the following hypothesis.
Average E¤ort Hypothesis: The average e¤orts in both stages of the NF condition and
in the rst stage of the TF condition are equal. Furthermore, the average e¤ort in the second
stage of the TF condition is lower than in the second stage of the NF condition.
The equality of e¤ort in both stages of the NF and the rst stage of the TF condition follows
from the identical rst order conditions given in equations (2) and (7). Expected second stage
e¤ort in the TF condition, however, is lower than e¤ort in both stages of the NF condition since
we implemented convex marginal costs.
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4 Results
We now present the key results obtained in our experiments. For all the tests and regressions
that follow, we use clustering on matching groups because the matching groups constitute our
independent units of observation.
4.1 Feedback Hypothesis
We rst focus on the behavior of contestants in the second stage of the TF condition. As
shown in Section 2, the theoretical model predicts that equilibrium e¤ort is decreasing in the
absolute value of the output di¤erence arising at the rst stage. Our rst results show that this
prediction is conrmed by the data.
Result 1 (information feedback): If the information about the agents output di¤erences
after stage 1 is truthful, the agentsaverage response to the feedback information closely tracks
the theoretical prediction. The second stage e¤ort is decreasing in the absolute value of the
output di¤erence.
Figure 1 shows the results of a bivariate Epanechnikov kernel regression together with the
models theoretical prediction. Average e¤ort is remarkably close to the theoretical predictions
of the model. The gure neatly indicates the strong e¤ort response to the information feedback
for larger absolute values of the output di¤erence. Note that the experimental results are
particularly close to the theoretical predictions when an agent is at a disadvantage at the
beginning of the second stage. The t is slightly worse for the case when the contestant is
ahead.
Table 2 summarizes the regression results. In accordance with the theoretical predictions
column (1) reports a highly signicant negative coe¢ cient on the absolute value of the rst
stage output di¤erence. In column (2) we further decompose this e¤ect by estimating separate
coe¢ cients for rst stage winners and losers, both of which are highly signicant and of the
correct sign. Column (2) indicates that the discouraging e¤ect on e¤ort of the rst stage output
di¤erence seems to be weaker for winners. Columns (3) and (4) show that these results are
robust to additional controls for round and an interaction e¤ect between round and the output
di¤erences.
Insert Table 2 here.
Taken together, Result 1 shows that agents response to truthful feedback is remarkably
close to the theoretical predictions of our model. It also powerfully demonstrates that there
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are strong incentives to manipulate feedback: when the output di¤erence jj falls by one unit,
the average second stage e¤ort increases by 0.30 to 0.53 units. Hence, self-interested principals
have strong incentives for lying if they have the opportunity to provide and manipulate the
feedback information.
4.2 Cheap Talk Hypothesis
So far, we have focused on a setting in which feedback is always truthful. We are interested in
what happens when information is relayed to the contestants through a self-interested principal
who maximizes total e¤ort and therefore has objectives that conict with truth-telling behavior.
We therefore turn to the analysis of the PF condition. The previous results highlight the
experimental support for the standard theoretical model when there is completely credible
feedback. In contrast, we will see that the theory does not perform similarly well in the present
setting where there are incentives for dishonesty and information manipulation.
The theory makes a particularly stark prediction with regards to the e¤orts chosen by the
agents when self-interested principals relay information. It predicts that all communication
should be uninformative and so the e¤ort choice of the contestants should be the same as in
the case where no feedback is given to them.
Result 2 (cheap talk e¤ort response): (a)The cheap talk hypothesis is unambiguously refuted
because the agentssecond stage e¤ort choices respond strongly to the information provided by
interested principals. (b) However, for a given reported output di¤erence the agents provide
considerably less second stage e¤ort in the PF condition compared to the TF condition suggesting
that agents partially discount the information provided by the principals.
Empirical support for Result 2a comes from Figure 2 which plots the predicted e¤ort re-
sponse in stage 2 in the PF condition (which is completely at), the actual average e¤ort
response to output di¤erences in the TF condition (using the same Epanechnikov Kernel re-
gression as in Figure 1) and the actual average e¤ort response in the PF condition.5
The gure transparently shows the refutation of the cheap talk hypothesis since there is
a very strong e¤ort response to the reported output di¤erence. Average e¤ort choices in the
PF condition vary considerably with the reports sent by the principals. Further support for
Result 2a comes from Table 3 which reports the e¤ects of principalsmessages on the second
stage e¤ort choices of agents in the PF condition. In column (1) in Table 3 we see that the
coe¢ cient on the reported absolute output di¤erence is negative and of similar magnitude as in
5Note that the range for which the Kernel regression for the PF condition can be drawn is much smaller
than the range for the TF condition since in the former more than 95% of all the reported rst stage output
di¤erences fall in the range between -25 and 25.
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the setting where feedback was fully credible. The discouraging e¤ect of the reported rst stage
output di¤erence is even larger when we winsorize the sample to eliminate extreme outliers (24
reported output di¤erences that fall outside the range between -30 and 30) as shown in column
(2) of Table 3. In column (3) we separately estimate the behavioral e¤ects on second stage
e¤orts for interim winners and losers. The e¤ect is particularly pronounced for interim losers
and in particular for the winsorized sample as shown in column (4).
Since agents respond to the information given by principals in the way described above,
it is perhaps not surprising that principals who lie more also earn more. Reporting a lower
than actual output di¤erence elicits higher e¤ort and thus a higher payo¤ for the principal. On
average, an incremental lie about the rst stage output di¤erence of one unit gives the principal
an additional payo¤ of 2.5 ECUs.
Insert Table 3 here.
Figure 2 also provides rst evidence for Result 2b. For a given reported output di¤erence
average e¤ort choices in the PF condition are lower than in the TF condition. This suggests that
when contestants receive information from a principal they realize, on average, that principals
have an incentive to report output di¤erences that are lower in absolute value than the actual
output di¤erence. For this reason agents may therefore adjust their e¤ort response accordingly.
We therefore investigate in detail whether the second stage e¤ort response to information
given in the PF condition is signicantly di¤erent from that observed in the TF condition.
Table 4 reports second stage e¤ort regressions with pooled data from both of these conditions.
Once again, we eliminate the same extreme outliers in the specications reported in columns
(2) and (4). Here, PRINCIPAL is a binary variable which is equal to one for all observations in
the PF condition and zero otherwise. On average, contestants exert signicantly less e¤ort for
any given level of the rst stage output di¤erence when the information is given to them by a
self-interested principal as shown by the large negative coe¢ cient on the PRINCIPAL variable
which is statistically signicant in all the specications reported in Table 4.
In addition, we are also interested in di¤erences in the slope of the average e¤ort response
function. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term j^j*PRINCIPAL is insignicant in columns
(1) and (2), but larger in magnitude in the winsorized sample shown in column (2). The point
estimate in column (2) shows that for a one point increase in the absolute value of the reported
output di¤erence in the PF condition contestants reduce their e¤ort by 0.66 units whereas they
only reduce it by 0.41 in the TF condition. This stronger e¤ort response by agents in the
PF condition further compensates for the underreportingbehavior by principals which we
document in later results. As the e¤ort response is potentially asymmetric for interim winners
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and losers, we estimate separate slopes and interaction terms in columns (3) and (4). Again,
the interactions with PRINCIPAL are not signicant as shown in column (3). Only in the
winsorized sample the slope of the e¤ort response to information about the rst stage output
di¤erence for interim losers is signicantly larger in the PF condition than in the TF condition
whereas the e¤ect is insignicant for the winners as shown in column (4).
Insert Table 4 here.
Faced with this evidence we conclude that information feedback does indeed a¤ect con-
testantsbehavior even when the information can be manipulated by a self-interested principal.
In particular, contestants shift their e¤ort response downward suggesting that when choosing
their e¤ort levels they anticipate the misreporting behavior of principals. When compared to
the TF condition, the feedback given by the principals clearly elicits lower e¤ort at all reported
output di¤erences.
4.3 Average E¤ort Hypothesis
Although the agents e¤ort response to reported output di¤erences is signicantly lower in
the PF condition it need not be the case that average e¤ort is also lower. This is because in
the PF condition the principals control the information feedback. If the principals compress
the reported output di¤erences relative to the true output di¤erences, the agents in the PF
condition may face a very di¤erent distribution of information feedback compared to the TF
condition and, therefore, it is not clear whether average e¤ort rises or falls in the PF condition
relative to the other two conditions. Our next result addresses this question
Result 3 (average e¤ort across treatments): a) In the PF condition the average e¤ort in
the rst and the second stage decreases over time. Therefore, towards the nal period average
e¤ort in the PF condition is signicantly lower than in the NF and the TF condition. (b) In
contrast, in the NF and the TF condition average e¤ort is constant over time and, as predicted
by theory, e¤ort levels in both of the NF and the rst stage of the TF condition are statistically
indistinguishable. Moreover, in line with theory, the average second stage e¤ort in the TF
condition is smaller than the second stage e¤ort in the NF condition.
A rst indication for Result 3 is provided by Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3 we show how
average e¤ort in the rst stage evolves over time across conditions. The gure shows that in
the NF and the TF condition average e¤ort is fairly stable over time while in the PF condition
it strongly decreases over time. In fact, towards the nal periods, average e¤ort in the PF
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condition is almost 25% lower than in the other two conditions. The impression conveyed by
Figure 3 is also supported by more formal statistical tests. In the NF and the TF condition the
average e¤ort in the rst three rounds is not signicantly di¤erent from the respective e¤ort
levels in the nal three rounds (t-test; p-value 0.259 for the NF condition; p-value 0.622 for
the TF condition). In contrast, the same test conrms a signicant di¤erence between the rst
three and the last three rounds in the PF condition (t-test, p-value 0.042), so that the average
e¤ort in the PF condition is also signicantly below the level in the other two conditions (t-test,
p-value 0.005 for the NF condition; p-value 0.013 for the TF condition). All these results are
also robust if we compare just the rst and the last round or the rst 5 and the last ve rounds
within each treatment or across the treatments. Finally, as predicted by the model in Section
2, the rst stage average e¤ort in the NF and the TF condition are not signicantly di¤erent
from each other (t-test, p-value 0.109).
A similar picture emerges when we examine how second stage e¤ort evolves over time al-
though the downwards trend in the PF condition starts a bit later than in the case of rst stage
e¤ort. Figure 4 shows that the second stage e¤ort in the NF and the TF condition is rather
stable over time. If we compare average e¤ort in the rst three and the last three periods we
nd no di¤erence (t-test; p-value 0.736 for the NF condition; p-value 0.642 for the TF condition)
while if we perform the same comparison in the PF treatment we observe a signicantly lower
average e¤ort during the nal three periods (t-test, p-value 0.023). The decline in average e¤ort
in the PF condition also implies that towards the end (in the nal three periods) average e¤ort
in the PF condition is signicantly lower than in the NF and the TF condition (t-test; p-value
0.001 for the comparison with the NF condition; p-value 0.007 for the comparison with the TF
condition). Figure 4 also neatly shows that the average second stage e¤ort in the NF condition
is higher than in the TF condition, a result that is also signicant (t-test, p-value 0.005).
Taken together, Result 3 indicates that the model presented in Section 2 organizes the data
very well in those conditions in which there is no feedback or fully truthful feedback. However,
if the agents receive feedback from the principals their e¤ort is not only smaller for any given
reported output di¤erence (Result 2) but average e¤ort eventually declines and is, nally,
signicantly below the e¤ort in the other two treatment conditions (Result 3). Apparently, the
opportunity for the principals to deceive the agents is detrimental for e¤ort provision and seems
to undermine the agentswillingness to compete in the tournament. It is also interesting that
the e¤ort decline is already present in the rst stage of the tournament. In fact, as Figure 3 and
4 reveal, the decline is even more pronounced in the rst stage. Recall, that according to the
theory presented in Section 2, the rst stage e¤ort should not be a¤ected by the informativeness
of the feedback that is given to the agents. Thus, the fact that the principals can lie in the
PF treatment should not a¤ect the agentse¤ort choices regardless of whether the principals
feedback is informative or not.
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4.4 PrincipalsCommunication Behavior
Result 2 and 3 unambiguously show that the agents behavior in the PF condition di¤ers
substantially from the theoretical predictions. We next ask what drives these departures from
the theory. One potential explanation for agents second stage e¤ort response documented
in Result 2 is that feedback is informative. We therefore investigate the reporting behavior
of principals in the PF condition. In this setting, the theory makes the particularly stark
prediction that communication by the principals should be completely uninformative since the
preferred message of the principal does not vary with the output di¤erence between the two
agents. A selsh principal unconstrained by honesty norms only intends to maximize her payo¤
and therefore, regardless of the actual output di¤erence, she will report the output di¤erence
that for a given belief of the agent maximizes the agents second stage e¤ort response. For
example, if the beliefs held by the agent are such that he exerts higher e¤ort when the reported
output di¤erence is smaller in absolute value, then a prot-maximizing principal should report
an output di¤erence close to zero.
As shown in Result 4 the experimental evidence is at odds with the theoretical prediction
that the information provided by the principals is completely uninformative.
Result 4 (feedback informativeness): The principalsmessages are partly informative for
the agents because higher reported output di¤erences are associated with higher actual output
di¤erences.
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of actual versus reported rst stage output di¤erences in the
interval [ 30; 30] for both variables as well as an OLS regression line within this range of ac-
tual output di¤erences. The shallow slope of the regression line is a result of the compression
of reported output di¤erences relative to actual output di¤erences. Although there is a large
amount of untruthful reporting there is also a substantial number of observations where princi-
pals report truthfully. In particular, for small output di¤erences in the interval [ 10; 10] many
observations are on the truthtelling line.6
Since agents do not know what kind of principal they face the appropriate level for the
analysis of the informativeness of the principalsfeedback information is the aggregate data.
When agents observe a message of ^i they do not know whether the message comes from a
truthful or a lying principal. We therefore performed OLS regressions (not reported) of  on
^i,

^i
2
and

^i
3
. The results of these regressions provide qualitative insight into the
extent to which the principalsmessages reveal information about actual output di¤erences.
6There are also a few observations where principals overreport the absolute value of the actual output
di¤erence. However, these observations almost exclusively occur in the rst three rounds until principals realize
that underreportingis more protable.
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In particular, they address the question what prediction an agent would make about  after
observing ^i if he had all the data of the experiment at his disposal.
In these regressions the coe¢ cient on the reported output di¤erence ^i is positive and signif-
icant at the 1% level throughout, indicating that there is clear link between actual realization
and the content of messages sent. Moreover, the R2 of the regressions shows that almost a
quarter (23%) of the variance in the actual output di¤erence is explained by the reported out-
put di¤erence suggesting that communication is at least partially informative for the agents.
In particular, if a contestant would have all the information that the experimenter has at his
disposal he would estimate that a reported output di¤erence of ^i = y would on average cor-
respond to an actual output di¤erence of about   2y. In other words, on average the actual
output di¤erence is about twice as large as the reported output di¤erence.
If agents believe that there is a positive relationship between reported and actual output
di¤erences, which indeed there is as documented in Result 4, then to e¤ect an increase in their
own payo¤ principals should report an output di¤erence that is generally lower in absolute
value than the actual output di¤erence. This aggregate underreporting behavior documented
in Result 4 suggests that principals clearly seem to understand that if their message is believed
and acted upon accordingly by the agents, reporting a lower output di¤erence will lead to higher
second stage e¤ort choices and hence higher payo¤s.
The informativeness of feedback also goes some way of explaining the e¤ort response of
agents in the PF condition. Having established that the messages sent by principals are at least
partially informative in the aggregate data, we now turn to a closer analysis of the reporting
behavior of principals at the individual level. In particular, we ask what factors drive the
principalsreporting behavior.
Result 5 (principalscommunication behavior): Reporting behavior is driven by the poten-
tial gains from lying. Principals are more likely to report the truth when the potential gains
from lying are small. Furthermore, the partial informativeness of messages is due to the hetero-
geneity among the principals: some principals always lie maximally about the rst stage output
di¤erence, but a signicant share of the principals reports close to the truth if the potential
gains from lying are relatively small. This heterogeneity is further supported by the fact that
Machiavellian personality traits predict lying behavior.
Figure 5 provides a rst indication that principals do not lie maximally by always reporting
an output di¤erence that is equal to 0, but sometimes choose to report larger output di¤erences.
To empirically test the prediction that principals are more likely to lie when the potential gains
to lying are larger we ran several regressions of the absolute divergence of the report from
the truth j^i   j on the maximum potential gain G from untruthful reporting. Denote the
maximum possible theoretical gain G of an untruthful report, if followed naively by an agent,
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by
G  
h
e2(^
i = 0)  e2(^i = )
i
:
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions which yield highly signicant positive coe¢ -
cient for the gain G regardless of whether we control for round e¤ects and interaction e¤ects
between rounds and G. On average an increase in G by one unit increases the extent of un-
truthful reporting by 0.4 units. Similar results hold for probit estimates (not reported) with
the probability of reporting untruthfully as the dependent variable.
Insert Table 5 here.
We also investigated the principals reports about agentsabsolute output in addition to
their reporting behavior with regard to the output di¤erence discussed above. In this case,
principals almost always report the truth (results not reported), i.e., the agent typically receives
truthful information about his own output while the information about the output di¤erence,
and, hence, the opponents output is biased. This provides additional evidence consistent with
our conjecture that lying behavior is essentially driven by the potential gains from untruthful
reporting because agentsbehavior is driven by reported output di¤erences and not by their
absolute output levels.
In order to investigate heterogeneity in principalscommunication behavior in more detail,
we performed the analysis displayed in Figure 5 for each of the 32 principals in our experimental
data. These individual level regressions reveal heterogeneity with respect to the principals
willingness to report the truth. Figure 6 shows the results for two principals (subjects #24 and
#43). Whereas the rst principal (subject #24) consistently reports output di¤erences that
are close to zero regardless of the actual output di¤erence, the second principal (subject #43)
truthfully reports for small absolute values of the rst stage output di¤erence.
The data contained in Figure 5 and, in particular, Figure 6 hint at the di¤erences in report-
ing behavior across principals. Given that such di¤erences exist, we are interested in analyzing
reporting behavior using subject-specic characteristics. Table 6 reports the results of OLS
regressions with the reported output di¤erence ^i as the dependent variable. If all principals
lie maximally all the time, then the coe¢ cient on  should be equal to 0. As can be seen
from Table 6, throughout all specications this coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from 0. This
means that the actual output di¤erence inuences reporting behavior. However, aggregate data
is not ideally suited to our analysis since there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to re-
porting behavior. To control for heterogeneity in reporting behavior we use the Machiavelli
score. We measured subjectsMachiavellism a combination of selshness and opportunism 
with the Machiavelli questionnaire (Christie and Geis 1970). In this questionnaire the subjects
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indicate their degree of agreement with statements such as Its hard to get ahead without
cutting corners here and thereand The best way to deal with people is to tell them what
they want to hear. Based on their scores on this questionnaire we classied principals in 3
di¤erent groups: low Machiavelli (lowest 10%), medium Machiavelli (middle 80%) and high
Machiavelli (highest 10%). For subjects with low and high Machiavelli scores we create the
binary variables LOWMACH and HIGHMACH. As can be seen from Table 6 in specications
(3) and (4), the interaction e¤ect *LOWMACH is positive and statistically signicant, show-
ing that principals with lower Machiavelli scores on the questionnaire also lied signicantly less
during the actual experiment. We can observe the opposite e¤ect for highly Machiavellian indi-
viduals since the interaction e¤ect *HIGHMACH is negative. However, even for these highly
Machiavellian individuals the combined coe¢ cient on  and *HIGHMACH is signicantly
di¤erent from 0 (p-value 0.0005) so that we can reject the null-hypothesis that for subjects
with strong Machiavellian personality traits the actual output di¤erence does not inuence the
output di¤erence they report. Specications (2) and (4) show that our analysis is robust to
round e¤ects.7
Insert Table 6 here.
4.5 What Drives the E¤ort Decline in the PF Condition?
While Result 4 provides a rationale for the agentssecond stage e¤ort response to feedback in
the PF condition, it does not explain the decline of average rst and second stage e¤ort in the
PF condition. Result 6 shows that this decline can be attributed to the experience of lying
behavior.
Result 6 (deception undermines incentives): The decline in average e¤ort over time is
strongly a¤ected by the agentsdeception experiences. The more often an agent has been deceived
in the past the more the agent reduces rst and second stage e¤ort.
As documented previously in Results 4 and 5, principals engage in untruthful underreport-
ingof the absolute value of the output di¤erence and hence a sophisticated agent who is or has
become aware of the principalsreporting strategy should respond to the messages accordingly
by reducing second stage e¤ort more than he would have done if the feedback given to him
7Note also that we included the ROUND and Machiavelli score variables separately in the regressions reported
in Table 6. These non-interaction terms are not signicant and therefore omitted in the presentation of Table
6.
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was entirely truthful. Result 6 indeed shows that on average agents respond correctly to the
manipulated information of principals.
How did the agents nd out whether they have been deceived by a principal? When an
agent has been told repeatedly in the past rounds that the rst stage output di¤erence is very
low in absolute value he might come to suspect that principals reported untruthfully. In fact,
according to responses of subjects in the post-experiment questionnaire such a very low rst
stage output di¤erence alerts agents that some principals may report untruthfully. When asked
how they detected whether principals engaged in lying behavior agents spontaneously cited low
absolute values of reported rst stage output di¤erences as the most important measure (64%
of agents). This intuition of agents is indeed correct since output di¤erences that are small in
absolute value are more likely to come from a dishonest than an honest principal.
We therefore construct a measure that adds up the occurrences of very low reported output
di¤erences for each agent over previous rounds. This measure of past lying behavior is the
lagged cumulative sum of the occurrence of low di¤erence reports (LOW DIFFERENCE). We
classied any report of the rst stage output di¤erence between  3 and 3 as a low di¤erence
thus creating a binary variable.8 About 38% of all reports over all the rounds of the experiment
fall into this range which also includes the modal report (2). The lagged cumulative sum of
the number of low reported output di¤erences captures the idea that agents who have more
reason to believe that they have been deceived in the past are more likely to discount feedback
information in the current round. The number of agents who experience such a low output
di¤erence increases over time. Whereas at the start of round 2 only 18 out of 64 contestants
have received very low feedback about the output di¤erence, in round 15 there are 61 contestants
who have previously received a very low output di¤erence report.
We investigate whether this measure of past lying behavior inuences second stage e¤ort
choice by running the regressions reported in Table 7. The experience of past lying behavior
leads contestants to exert less e¤ort in stage 2 as specications (2), (3) and (4) reveal. In
all these specications the coe¢ cient on the lagged cumulative sum of low output di¤erence
report occurrences is negative and statistically signicant and the e¤ort response to information
feedback is now even more pronounced than in the models for the PF condition presented in
Table 3. On average, for any low reported output di¤erence that a contestant has received
from a principal in the past he reduces e¤ort by 0:99 as shown in column (2). Note that the
coe¢ cient on the ROUND variable which is signicant in column (1), is no longer signicant
whenever we control for past lying experiences. In fact, when we control for past lying behavior
the coe¢ cient for the round variable becomes even positive (though insignicant). Thus the
decline in second stage e¤ort over time is not simply a time trend but it seems to be driven by
8We also conducted robustness checks with di¤erent cut-o¤ levels and di¤erent measures of deception occur-
rences. The results were qualitatively similar.
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the experience of past lying behavior.
Insert Table 7 here.
Next, we analyze whether similar e¤ects can be found for rst stage e¤ort. According to the
model in Section 2 the information agents receive at the end of the rst stage is only relevant for
second stage e¤ort. First-stage e¤ort should be the same regardless of how much information
is transmitted; therefore it should be the same across all three conditions (NF, TF and PF)
and constant over time. As Result 3b showed this is in fact the case for the rst stage e¤ort in
the NF and TF condition, where average rst stage e¤orts were statistically indistinguishable
and constant over time despite the di¤erences in information release before the beginning of
the second stage.
As before, we investigate whether the e¤ort decline in the PF condition is a reaction to the
increasing awareness of agents that principals are lying. We run OLS regressions of rst stage
e¤ort on the past lying measure (LOW DIFFERENCE) and the number of rounds shown in
Table 8. On average, for any low reported output di¤erence that a contestant has received from
a principal in the past he reduces e¤ort by 1:07 as shown in column (2). As in our analysis of
second stage e¤ort, the coe¢ cient on the ROUND variable which is signicant in column (1) is
no longer signicant. Finally, we note that our results are robust to di¤erent cut-o¤ levels for
the classication of low di¤erence reports. Model (3) in Table 8 also reports regression results
for the symmetric cut-o¤ level of [ 1; 1].
Insert Table 8 here.
We also investigated whether there is a similar e¤ect on rst and second stage e¤ort in the
TF condition where feedback is truthful. As expected, there is no signicant evidence of such
an e¤ect regardless of the cut-o¤ we choose for classifying a low di¤erence. Thus the behavior
documented in Tables 7 and 8 is due to agents anticipating that principals are lying rather than
the consequence of a simple learning e¤ect for second stage e¤ort.
5 Interpretation
The previous section shows that when there is either no feedback (NF condition) or completely
truthful feedback (TF condition) the theoretical model proposed in Section 2 works remarkably
well. The experimental evidence largely conrms the predictions of the model; the agents e¤ort
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is decreasing in jj and the average e¤ort in both stages of the NF condition and the rst stage
of the TF condition are very similar. In addition, the average e¤ort in the second stage of the
TF condition is smaller than e¤ort in the NF condition. Note that this prediction relies on a
subtle aspect of the model (the convexity of the marginal cost function) and we nd it quite
remarkable that the data support it.
In contrast, when information can be manipulated and feedback is given by self-interested
principals, the theoretical model is no longer supported by the experimental data. Contrary to
the theoretical predictions, communication by principals is at least partially informative and
agents strongly respond to the messages sent by principals. Furthermore, agents signicantly
reduce their average e¤ort in the rst and the second stage if they have experienced lies in the
past. It seems that the principalsdeceitful behavior thoroughly undermines e¤ort provision.
These experimental results naturally lead to us to ask a new set of questions: Can we explain
the failure of the cheap talk hypothesis with a simple and parsimonious theoretical model? Are
other theories equally successful at explaining the theoretical results about principalsreporting
behavior and agentse¤ort choice?
In this section we interpret our experimental ndings in the light of the failure of the cheap
talk hypothesis, the evidence gathered from the previously discussed results and a simple and
parsimonious model of lying aversion, which explains many of the puzzling features documented
previously. Furthermore, we show that social preference theories based on motives of altruism,
reciprocity and inequity aversion cannot explain key observations such as the informativeness of
the principalsmessages. The lying aversion model is developed in greater detail in Appendix
B, and Appendix C contains a more detailed analysis of the predictions of social preference
theories.
Before we address the question of how the existence of lying averse subjects can account for
many observations in the PF condition, it is worthwhile to stress that lying aversion cannot
play a role in an environment in which lying is impossible. Thus, lying aversion obviously
cannot a¤ect behavior in the NF and TF treatment, implying that the predictions of the
model described in Section 2 apply. Therefore, the fact that behavior in the NF and TF
condition largely meets the predictions of the model in Section 2 is perfectly consistent with
the assumptions of lying aversion.
5.1 PrincipalsReporting Behavior
We begin our analysis with the reporting behavior of principals. In our baseline theoretical
model of Section 2 principals would report whichever output di¤erence maximized an agents
e¤ort for a given belief of the agent; principals should therefore deviate from reporting the truth
whenever it is in their interest to do so. Consider the following situation in which the principal
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holds xed beliefs such that an agent will exert higher e¤ort for a reported output di¤erence
that is lower in absolute value. Clearly, this is a reasonable assumption given the observed
average e¤ort response in the PF condition shown in Figure 2.
Now, consider the case of heterogenous principals who have di¤erent preferences for truth-
telling because they su¤er di¤erent disutility when they report untruthfully. When deciding
what message ^i to send to agent i they have to weigh the benets against the disutility of
lying. When agents exert higher e¤ort for a reported output di¤erence that is lower in absolute
value then the benets of lying come from underreportingthe output di¤erence. However,
since such underreportingalso involves costs when the principal is averse to lying, she may
often choose to keep lying disutility low by not lying maximally, i.e. she will not report an
output di¤erence very close or equal to zero, or even avoid lying costs altogether by reporting
truthfully. When principals have a preference for reporting truthfully then the actual output
di¤erence matters for the principals reporting behavior. This is one of the key predictions
(Theoretical Result 1) of the lying aversion model presented in Appendix B which eshes out
the above argument more formally and in more detail. The rationale for lying as a cost-benet
decision is further supported by the evidence summarized in Result 5 where we show that
reporting behavior is driven by the gains from lying. Clearly, the fact that there is some
truthful reporting and the reports in general depend on the actual realization of the output
di¤erence is what makes communication at least partially informative.
Theoretical Result 1 also shows that each reported rst stage output di¤erence should be
either equal to or smaller in absolute value than the actual output di¤erence. This e¤ect is
due to the e¤ort-increasing e¤ects for underreportingdescribed above. Again, the theoretical
result is strongly supported in our data where more than 95% of all reports are either truthful
(i.e., equal to the actual output di¤erence) or smaller in absolute value than the actual output
di¤erence.
While our model of lying aversion can explain the principalsbehavior, theories of social
preference based on motives of altruism, reciprocity or inequity aversion fail to do so. We show
this in more detail in Appendix C and provide some intuition here. When the principal has
altruistic motives and cares equally about the two agents, she is indi¤erent which agent wins the
tournament. The principals private reporting decision to an agent is therefore only a¤ected by
second stage e¤ort (multiplied by ) chosen by the agent and the associated cost of e¤ort. Since
second stage e¤ort only depends on the reported output di¤erence, but not the actual output
di¤erence, which is not observed by the agent, the optimal report of an altruistic principal is
independent of the actual rst stage output di¤erence. As a result, we should not observe any
systematic relationship between actual and reported output di¤erences whereas in the data
we clearly do. The same argument applies to an inequity-averse principal or a principal who
responds reciprocally to the rst stage output levels by putting more weight on the welfare of
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the agent with a higher output.
It is also worthwhile to point out that the concept of quantal response equilibrium does
not seem to be able to explain the dependence of the principalsmessages on the true output
di¤erences. The reason for this is that the quantal response approach assumes that players
play noisy best replies, i.e., they tend to make mistakes and these mistakes are more likely if
the costs of a mistake are low. In our PF condition, the agentse¤ort response to a reported
output di¤erence is given by the graph displayed in Figure 2. A self-interested principal who
plays a noisy best reply to this e¤ort response should always report the output di¤erence that
maximizes her payo¤with the highest probability but due to the noise in the best reply she
will also report neighboring output di¤erences with positive probability. Thus, this approach
can explain why principals will not always tell the truth but it cannot explain why the principals
feedback information depends on the true output di¤erence.
As documented in Result 5 there is heterogeneity in reporting behavior across principals;
some principals lie more and more often than others. In our model of lying aversion this di¤er-
ence in preferences is captured by a lying aversion parameter which determines the strength of
lying aversion and varies across principals. Consider two principals with di¤erent levels of lying
aversion who observe the same rst stage output di¤erence and decide how to report to the
agents. Reporting untruthfully generates the same benets for the two principals, however for
the same deviation from the truth the more lying-averse principal su¤ers greater disutility than
her less scrupulous counterpart. As a result, more lying-averse principals will lie less in equi-
librium. This prediction is also apparent in our experimental data where principals with weak
Machiavellian personality traits lie considerably less often than principals with intermediate or
strong Machiavellian traits as shown in Result 5 and Table 6.
5.2 Agent E¤ort Response
Turning our focus to the e¤ort choice of agents it seems that the main reason why the baseline
model fails in the PF condition is the informative content of principalsmessages. In fact,
once we recognize that communication is informative key aspects of agentsbehavior in the PF
condition make sense.
The previous section showed that all principals will either underreportor report truthfully,
but will never report untruthfully when they do not gain from doing so. As a result, any agent
should expect that the actual rst stage output di¤erence  relevant for his second stage e¤ort
decision is larger in absolute value than the rst stage output di¤erence ^i reported to him.
As we showed in our discussion of Result 4, on average the actual rst stage output di¤erence
is about twice as large as the reported one and more than 95% of all reports are either truthful
(i.e., equal to the actual output di¤erence) or smaller in absolute value than the actual output
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di¤erence. Hence, for any given reported output di¤erence a rational agent should exert less
e¤ort than in the case where feedback is completely truthful. This is exactly the behavior we
derive in Theoretical Result 2 in Appendix B: for a given report agents are predicted to exert
less e¤ort in the PF condition than in the TF condition.
While the experimental data strongly support the qualitative predictions of our model,
we are also interested in how close actual second stage e¤ort choices are to optimal e¤ort
choices. An optimal e¤ort choice requires agents to perform the correct inference from a message
sent by the principal as well as making an appropriate e¤ort choice. In our discussion of
the TF condition we already showed that agents e¤ort choices are close to optimal when all
communication is truthful and there is no complicated inference process. Consider now the case
of a rational agent in the PF condition. Since there is heterogeneity in lying behavior among
principals, when receiving a report about the rst stage output di¤erence ^i the agent does
not know exactly what the actual output di¤erence  is. However, he knows the distribution
of the actual output di¤erence. In other words, the agent knows the posterior distribution
of  following a message ^i which is given by Pr( j ^i). Consequently, he also knows his
conditional probability of winning the tournament which is given by
Pr(ei2   ej2 ++"2 > 0 j ^i):
Given this posterior distribution the agent chooses his second stage e¤ort level appropriately.
We can back out the posterior distribution of  given ^i from our experimental data
using Kernel estimation and then compute the optimal response for a given ^i.9 This optimal
response function is shown in Figure 7 alongside the actual average second stage e¤ort response
for the range of ^i 2 [ 25; 25] into which more than 95% of all messages fall. Figure 7 shows
that the actual e¤ort responses in the PF condition are relatively close to the optimal e¤ort
responses although the actual responses do not match the optimal response in every detail. In
fact, the deviation of actual from optimal behavior is not statistically signicant (t-test, p-value
0.16).
5.3 Dynamics
We are also interested in understanding the dynamics of e¤ort choices in the PF condition. As
shown by Result 6 contestants who receive a higher number of low output di¤erence reports
in previous periods, adjust their second stage e¤ort response downwards. Our model of lying
aversion (Theoretical Result 3) explains this behavior by a simple updating process about the
9In the specication we report in Figure 7, we assumed that following a message ^i player i knows the exact
equilibrium e¤ort of his opponent. However, we also performed the same analysis for the case where following a
message ^i player i only knows the distribution of e¤orts of his opponent. The results are essentially the same.
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relative proportions of high and low lying-averse principals on behalf of the agents. If agents are
uncertain about the exact proportions of honest and dishonest principals, they will update their
beliefs about the relative proportions of honest (more lying-averse) and dishonest (less lying-
averse) principals according to the messages they have received in the past. The interaction
with more dishonest principals which entails repeatedly observing an output di¤erence that is
particularly low in absolute value, will then lead agents to rationally expect that the actual
proportion of dishonest principals is high. In turn, when agents believe that the proportion of
lying principals is high they will adjust their e¤ort response downward by treating any message
they receive more skeptically. By reporting output di¤erences that are low in absolute value a
principal achieves a higher payo¤ for himself, but also undermines the collective credibility of
principals which leads to a changed second stage e¤ort response in later periods.
There is one feature in our data that our model, which departs from the standard model
only by introducing rational lying aversion among the principals, cannot readily explain. In
Result 3 we show that rst stage average e¤ort strongly declines over time. However, rational
and self-interested agents should not change their rst stage e¤orts regardless of how much the
principals underreport the true output di¤erences (see Section 2). The rational response of a
self-interested agent to underreporting is to discount the principalsmessages and to choose
the second stage e¤ort accordingly. Yet, in fact the principalsunderreporting of the truth
seems to more thoroughly undermine the agentswillingness to provide e¤ort by reducing rst
stage performance. It is possible to account for this phenomenon if one extends the notion
of lying aversion such that lying aversion not only incorporates the psychic costs of lying but
also the resistance of the victim of the lie. The evidence in Sanchez-Pages & Vorsatz (2007)
and Brandts & Charness (2003) indicates the existence of subjects that are willing to punish
lying per se. These authors show that the same payo¤ consequences trigger quite di¤erent
punishment behaviors depending on whether the payo¤s have been generated by a lie. Subjects
are much more willing to punish an opponent for generating a payo¤allocation if the opponents
behavior is based on a lie. In our setting, the anticipation of being the victim of a lie could have
induced the agents to decrease also their rst stage e¤ort. Moreover, agents who have more
reason to believe that the principal will lie, i.e., those agents who experienced a higher number
of small output reports in the past, also have more reason to respond with a lower rst stage
e¤ort.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that deceptive information by the principals eventually undermines
the e¤ectiveness of performance incentives. The principals initially benet from deceiving the
agents because the underreporting of output di¤erences induces agents to work harder com-
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pared to a truthful output report. However, despite massive underreporting the average e¤ort
in the second stage of the tournament eventually falls below the e¤ort in the No Feedback treat-
ment and the Truthful Feedback treatment because the agents strongly discount the principals
feedback information. Moreover, the agents not only reduce their e¤ort in direct response to
the principalsfeedback but they also show a strong decline in rst stage e¤ort levels indicating
a pervasively negative e¤ect of deception on tournament incentives. This decline in average
e¤ort levels seems to be driven by agentsprevious experiences of deception.
In order to assess these results it is important to keep in mind that the agents knew that the
winner of the tournament was determined objectively by the total output di¤erence after stage
two. Therefore, the principals could not engage in favoritism by falsely proclaiming one player
the winner of the tournament, nor did the principals have incentives to do so in our setting. In
our view, this renders the fact that the agents average rst and second stage e¤ort in the PF
condition falls below the e¤ort in the No Feedback and the Truthful Feedback condition all the
more remarkable. This nding suggests that for an organization it may be better to provide no
feedback to the agents in promotion tournaments unless the principal can commit to provide
fully truthful feedback. In view of our results it is interesting that the organizational behavior
literature (Meyer, & French (1965), Beer (1987), Gibbs (1991)) documents the widespread
absence of performance feedback in rms.
Our data suggest that the detrimental impact of the principalsfeedback on average e¤ort is
due to the deceptive nature of this feedback. However, the data also suggest that the principals
imperfect lying behavior, i.e., the fact that the principalsmessages are informative about the
true output di¤erences, also played a role. If the principals feedback had been completely
unreliable the agents would have had an incentive to behave as if they had been given no
information. Recall that according to the chosen experimental parameters e¤ort in the NF
condition is predicted to be (and actually turned out to be) even higher than in the TF condition,
that is, if the agents had completely disregarded the principalsfeedback we should not have
observed a detrimental e¤ect of feedback information on incentives.
We regard it, however, as an open question whether agents would indeed not respond at
all to completely deceptive (i.e., completely uninformative) feedback by the principals. It is
hard to believe that extreme forms of intentional lying do not provoke some e¤ect on agents
e¤ort. In fact, the strong decline in rst stage e¤ort levels in our setting is consistent with the
idea that people dislike being the victim of a lie. In view of our results we thus believe that it
is worthwhile to study the psychological forces associated with lying and the consequences of
these forces for contracts and incentives. A large class of contracting problems is characterized
by lying incentives, and a better understanding of the motivational forces associated with lying
or with being the victim of a lie may enhance our understanding of these problems.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 First Stage E¤ort in the TF Condition
When feedback is truthful at the beginning of the rst stage agent i chooses ei1 to maximize his
utility
U i = p+ (P   p)G(ei1 + ~ei2   ej1   ~ej2)  c(ei1)  E

c(~ei2)

:
Dene the noise di¤erence t as
t  "it   "jt
then
 = ei1   ej1 + 1:
Since the noise di¤erences are independently (normally) distributed we can rewrite the princi-
pals utility in the following way
U i = p+ (P   p)E1

F (ei1 + ~e
i
2   ej1   ~ej2 + 1)
  c(ei1)  E1 c(~ei2) :
To obtain the rst order conditions we di¤erentiate this expression with respect to ei1. The rst
order conditions are given by
c0(ei1) = (P   p)E1

f(ei1 + ~e
i
2   ej1   ~ej2 + 1)

(A1)
+(P   p)E1

f
 
ei1 + ~e
i
2   ej1   ~ej2 + 1
 d~ei2
dei1

  E1

c0
 
~ei2
 d~ei2
dei1

 (P   p)E1
"
f(ei1 + ~e
i
2   ej1   ~ej2 + 1)
d~ej2
dei1
#
:
The rst line of equation (A1) captures the direct e¤ect of ei1, the second line represents the
e¤ect of ei1 on ~e
i
2, and the third line is the strategic e¤ect of e
i
1 on ~e
j
2. The three lines correspond
to the three di¤erent e¤ects discussed in the main part of the paper. We now show that the
second and the third line are zero.
Denote the second line of (A1) by K. We note the symmetry of the second-period equilib-
rium e¤ort levels, ~ei2 = ~e
j
2 and use the law of iterated expectations to rewrite the second line in
the following way
K = EE1

(P   p)f()  c0(~ei2())
 d~ei2()
dei1
j 

= E
d~ei2()
dei1
E1

(P   p)f()  c0(~ei2()) j 

= 0
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since
(P   p)f() = c0(~ei2())
which is the rst order condition of the second stage e¤ort choice given in equation (4).
The strategic e¤ect given by the third line of (A1) is zero as well in a symmetric equilibrium.
Denote the term in the third line of (A1) by S. First, there is a rst stage equilibrium that is
symmetric in e¤ort levels, i.e.,
~ei1 = ~e
j
1  ~e1
and therefore  = 1. Second, the second stage e¤ort equilibrium is symmetric
~ei2() = ~e
j
2() = ~e2()
and ~e2() is symmetric in  around 0, i.e.,
~e2() = ~e2( ):
Substituting these expressions into the third line we obtain
S = (P   p)E1
"
f(ei1 + ~e
i
2   ej1   ~ej2 + 1)
d~ej2()
dei1
#
= (P   p)E1

f(1)
d~e2(1)
d1

= (P   p)E1 [f(1)~e02(1)]
where
~e02(1) 
d~e2(1)
d1
:
From the properties of the density function we know that f is symmetric in 1 around 0.
Furthermore, from equation (5) characterizing equilibrium second stage stage e¤ort we know
that ~e2(1) is symmetric in 1 around 0 and that it achieves a maximum at 1 = 0, so
f(1) = f( 1)
~e2(1) = ~e2( 1)
~e02(1) =  ~e02( 1)
~e02(0) = 0:
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Rewriting the expression for S we have
S = (P   p)
Z 1
 1
f(1)~e
0
2(1)f(1)d1
= (P   p)
Z 0
 1
[f(1)]
2 ~e02(1)d1 +
Z 1
0
[f(1)]
2 ~e02(1)d1

= (P   p)

 
Z 0
 1
[f( 1)]2 ~e02( 1)d1 +
Z 1
0
[f(1)]
2 ~e02(1)d1

= (P   p)

 
Z 1
0
[f(1)]
2 ~e02(1)d1 +
Z 1
0
[f(1)]
2 ~e02(1)d1

= 0:
The rst order condition therefore simplies to
c0(~e1) = (P   p)g(0):
A.2 Expected Second Stage E¤ort in the TF Condition
In equilibrium, the expected e¤ort in the second stage in the TF condition E[~e2] where feedback
is truthful, is lower (higher) than e¤ort in the NF condition e where no feedback is given, if
the marginal cost function c0 is convex (concave).
Since the noise di¤erences are independently (normally) distributed equation (2) can be
rewritten in the following way
c0(e) = (P   p)g(0)
= (P   p)E1 [f(1)]
= E1 [(P   p)f()]
= E1 [c
0(~e2())]
where we used the fact that ~ei1 = ~e
j
1  ~e1 (and therefore  = 1) as well as equation (4). Using
Jensens inequality we can provide a ranking of ~e2() which is a random variable and e which
is a constant. If c0 is convex, then Jensens inequality implies
c0(e) = E1 [c
0(~e2())]  c0(E1 [~e2()])
and hence e  E[~e2] since c0 is increasing. Clearly, if c0 is concave the reverse inequalities hold.
If the cost function is quadratic, then marginal cost is linear and e = E[~e2].
B A Model of Communication with Lying Aversion
In this appendix we present a model that provides the theoretical underpinnings for our dis-
cussion and interpretation of results in Section 5.
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There is evidence from psychological and economic research that individuals are averse to
lying even when it is in their interest to do so (Mazar & Ariely (2006), Gneezy (2005), Sanchez-
Pages & Vorsatz (2007)).
Consider the following change in the principals payo¤ function
UP = 
 
xA1 + x
B
1 + x
A
2 + x
B
2
  P   p  l X
i=A;B
h

j^i  j

(B1)
where h

j^i  j

is a lying term that is increasing (h0  0) and convex (h00  0) in the
absolute value of the di¤erence between the reported output di¤erence ^i and the actual output
di¤erence . The principal su¤ers disutility when she reports an output di¤erence that di¤ers
from the truth and this disutility is increasing in the di¤erence between the reported value and
the truth. Note that l is a positive constant that may vary across principals. The higher is l
the stronger is the principals aversion to lying.
B.1 Communication Equilibrium
We now characterize a communication equilibrium with naive senders. When considering what
message ^i to send to agent i the principal has to weigh the benets against the disutility
of lying. Naive senders believe that agents do not anticipate that the sender will not report
truthfully. In other words, they believe that the agents will not adjust their e¤ort behavior in
response to the principalslies.
For a given  taking rst order conditions for a report to agent i we nd that principals
utility varies with ^i in the following way
@UP
@^i
= 
@e^i2
@^i
  lh0

j^i  j

: (B2)
The rst term on the left-hand side of the equation is the marginal benet of lying whereas the
second term gives the marginal cost of lying.
In contrast to our model without lying disutility the optimal message now depends on .
Furthermore, note that e^i2 () is a function that has the shape of a normal density. For values
of  close to zero second stage e¤ort e^i2 is not very responsive to changes in , that is, the
marginal benet of lying is very small in that range. Hence, if the marginal cost of lying is
strictly increasing (h0 > 0), for l large enough and close enough to zero the principals optimal
report ^i is a corner solution, that is the principal reports the truth. For a principal with
lying aversion l denote this cuto¤ for jj below which truthful reporting occurs by (l), in
other words, if jj < (l) then
^i () = :
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Note that this cuto¤ (l) is increasing in l. Clearly, as the principals lying aversion goes to
zero, this cuto¤ will go to zero, i.e., (0) = 0, so a principal who is not lying-averse will lie
maximally (report 0) all of the time.
The marginal benet of lying increases as jj increases and may eventually overwhelm the
disutility of lying. This is because as jj increases the slope of e^i2 () may become steeper than
the slope of the lying term. Lying, however, is not maximal since the optimal message ^i is
not equal to 0, but is given by the report that balances the marginal benet and marginal cost
of lying,

@e^i2
@^i
= lh0

j^i  j

: (B3)
One should also note that since the second stage e¤ort has the same shape as a normal
density, which is at around the mean of 0 and also at in the tails, the marginal benet to
lying decreases again as jj increases above 40. Thus, at some point given by (l) it will no
longer be protable at all for the principal to lie. This feature of our model is unobservable in
our data since even very honest principals (with high l) would report truthfully only for very
large values of jj. For example, according to our model a very honest principal (such as the
principal shown in right panel of Figure 6) who reports truthfully for jj < 20 (so (l) = 20)
should also report truthfully for jj > 64 (so (l) = 64). In our data, this principal is never
put in such a situation. In fact, when calculating the principal-specic cuto¤s (l) from our
data and the implied cuto¤s (l) we nd that extreme realizations of jj > (l) constitute
less than 0.5% of our data. We therefore ignore this slightly peculiar feature of our model.
In summary, this gives our rst theoretical result.
Theoretical Result 1: If the principals believe that agents will naively follow their report,
for small values of jj < (l) the principals optimal reporting strategy ^i () for a given 
is to report truthfully, i.e.
^i () =  if jj < (l)
and it is characterized by the rst order condition in (B3) for intermediate values, (l) <
jj < (l). Furthermore, the reported output di¤erence is always lower than the true output
di¤erence,
j^ij  jj:
Principals with lower l lie more. If lying aversion is su¢ ciently large, principals always report
the truth ^i () =  and principals always lie maximally ^i () = 0 if lying aversion is
su¢ ciently small.
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B.2 E¤ort Choice
Consider now the agentse¤ort choice. As mentioned before, there is heterogeneity with respect
to lying aversion among the principals and agents do not know with which principal they are
matched. The agents therefore do not know each principals aversion to lying given by the
parameter l and the resulting cuto¤ (l) above which lying occurs. A report ^i may be
truthful if it is coming from a truthful principal with high l or it may be a lie sent by a
principal with low l. However, from Theoretical Result 1 we know that
j^ij  jj
since principals would never want to tell a lie if it decreases their pecuniary payo¤. Realizing
that principals have an incentive to underreport agents should adjust their response accordingly.
This gives us our second theoretical result.
Theoretical Result 2: For a given reported rst stage output di¤erence ^i second stage
e¤ort in the PF condition is lower than in the TF condition, that is we have
e^i2

^i

 ~ei2

^i

8^i
where e^i2

^i

and ~ei2

^i

represents the second stage e¤orts in the PF condition and in the
TF condition, respectively.
B.3 Dynamics
We now turn to a theoretical analysis of the dynamics observed in the data. Consider the
following simplication. Assume that the principals are independently drawn from a population
of two types of senders. With probability  the sender has low lying aversion l > 0, otherwise
(probability 1   ) the sender has high lying aversion with l > l. Contestants are initially
uncertain about the exact proportion  of sender types, but hold a correct prior m where
E[] = m:
The agents update their beliefs about  to form a posterior ^i according to information
obtained while playing in the experiment. As shown before, for a given output di¤erence  a
principal with low lying aversion will lie more than a principal with high lying aversion. Thus,
a reported output di¤erence that is particularly low in absolute value, i.e. j^ij < k where k
is positive but small, increases the probability that it was sent by a principal with low lying
aversion.
More importantly though, in this setting where the exact probability  is unknown (in
contrast to where it is known with certainty) receiving a low output di¤erence message does
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not only provide information about the type of the sender but also provides information about
the actual proportions of low- and high-lying-averse principals. Ceteris paribus, a contestant
who has received a low output di¤erence message j^ij < k in previous rounds will now hold
a higher posterior ^i than a contestant who has not received such a message. Furthermore,
a contestant with a higher posterior ^i anticipates there to be more lying (due to a higher
proportion of lying principals) and will therefore adapt his e¤ort response accordingly. In
particular, we have
e^i2

^i; ^i

 e^i2

^i; ^i0

8^i and ^i  ^i0:
This yields our third theoretical result which captures the dynamic e¤ort response e¤ects doc-
umented in Result 6.
Theoretical Result 3: For a given reported output di¤erence contestants who in previous
rounds have received low output di¤erence reports such that j^ij < k where k > 0 but small
should exert lower second stage e¤ort levels than contestants who have not received such low
output di¤erences.
C Social Preference Theories
In Appendix B we outlined a simple model of lying aversion that is able to explain the failure
of the cheap talk hypothesis. In this appendix we consider other theories that depart from
selsh maximization of monetary gains. We show, in particular, that social preference theories
based on motives of altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion cannot explain key features of
our experimental results such as the dependence of ^i on .
C.1 Altruism
Consider the case of an altruistic principal with the following objective function
UP = 
 
xA1 + x
B
1 + x
A
2 + x
B
2
  P   p+  X
i=A;B
U i
where  reects how much the principal cares about the payo¤s of the agents. We can rewrite
the objective function in the following way
UP = 
 
xA1 + x
B
1 + x
A
2 + x
B
2
  (1  )(P + p)   2X
t=1
X
i=A;B
c(eit):
In contrast to the rst stage e¤ort choices ei1 which do not depend on the principals messages
^i, the second stage e¤ort e^i2(^
i) is inuenced by the principals message. However, since
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the agent never observes the actual output di¤erence , the second stage e¤ort e^i2(^
i) does
not depend on . The interior solution for the message to agent i is given by the rst order
condition
@UP
@^i
=
@e^i2
@^i

   c0(ei2)

= 0 for i = A;B: (C1)
Note, that this expression does not depend on  and hence for every value of  the principal
should report the same value of ^i. This is clearly refuted by the data since for almost all
principals there is a signicantly positive relationship between  and ^i.
C.2 Reciprocal Altruism
Consider now the case of a reciprocally altruistic principal. Since the interim winner of a
tournament has produced more output for the principal the principal might care more about
the interim winners payo¤ than the interim losers. When agent A is ahead, that is   0,
then the principal attaches a weight  to agent As and a weight  to agent Bs payo¤ and vice
versa when  < 0, where   . This captures the e¤ect of reciprocity.
Since the setting is symmetric without loss of generality, let   0 so that the principal
feels more altruistic to agent A than to agent B. The principals objective function is therefore
given by
UP = 
 
xA1 + x
B
1 + x
A
2 + x
B
2
  P   p+ UA + UB:
The rst order conditions for ^i are
@UP
@^A
=
@e^A2
@^A

 + (  )(P   p)f(e^A2   e^B2 +)  c0(eA2 )

= 0
@UP
@^B
=
@e^B2
@^B

   (  )(P   p)f(e^A2   e^B2 +)  c0(eB2 )

= 0:
Multiplying the rst condition by @e^
B
2
@^B
and the second condition by @e^
A
2
@^A
and adding these two
equations we obtain after simplication
2   c0(e^A2 )  c0(e^B2 ) = 0 (C2)
which has to hold for interior solutions of ^i regardless of the value of . As in our previous
analysis this expression does not depend on  and hence for every value of  the principal
should report the same values of ^i which is refuted by the data.
C.3 Inequity Aversion
Consider the case of an inequity-averse principal with preferences given by
UP = P   
2
X
i=A;B
max

U i   P ; 0	  
2
X
i=A;B
max

P   U i; 0	
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where
P = 
 
xA1 + x
B
1 + x
A
2 + x
B
2
  P   p
and    > 0.
We analyze three cases here where the principals prot is either greater or smaller than the
payo¤ of both agents, or between the two. As we will see, inequity aversion cannot explain the
reporting behavior of principals in any of the three cases.
First, if P  maxfUA; UBg then the principals utility is given by
UP = P   
2
X
i=A;B
max

P   U i; 0	
and hence the same conclusions hold as for the case of simple altruism where the state of nature
 does not inuence the principals choice of message.
Second, if P  minfUA; UBg then preferences are given by
UP = P   
2
X
i=A;B
max

U i   P ; 0	 :
In this case the principal behaves spitefully but otherwise the same argument as in the rst
case applies, i.e., the message should not depend on .
Third, consider the case where P lies between the two agents, e.g. UA  UP  UB. In
this case, the principals rst order conditions are given by
@UP
@^A
=
@e^A2
@^A

1 +
  
2

 +
+ 
2
(P   p)f(e^A2   e^B2 +) 

2
c0(e^A2 )

= 0
@UP
@^B
=
@e^B2
@^B

1 +
  
2

   + 
2
(P   p)f(e^A2   e^B2 +) +

2
c0(e^B2 )

= 0
which we can add and simplify to obtain
2

1 +
  
2

 +

2
c0(e^A2 ) 

2
c0(e^B2 ) = 0: (C3)
As in the previous cases this condition does not depend on  and hence the optimal message
should not depend on the rst stage output di¤erence .
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Table 1 
Parameterization and Predictions 
 
Table 1 outlines the parameterization chosen for the laboratory experiments and presents the theoretical predictions derived 
from the theoretical model using the chosen parameter values. The parameters θ, c(e), P, p and σ denote the marginal benefit of 
agents’ effort for the principal, the agent’s cost of effort, the prizes for winners and losers of the tournament and the standard 
deviation of the noise. Starred effort levels are predictions for the NF condition, whereas effort levels with a tilde are 
predictions for the TF condition. We also give predictions for the cost of effort, the expected utility of an agent and the utility 
of the principal in the TF condition.  
 
Parameterization  Predictions 
θ 4  e* = ẽ1 37.00 
c(e) (r/3)e3  ẽ2(∆) 37 4 2 exp − Δ
2
1600
 
r 1/686  E[ẽ2] 35.93 
P 300  c(e*) 24.60 
p 100  E[Ui(e*)] 150.80 
σ 20√2  UP(e*) 192.00 
 
Note: We chose parameters in such a way that the equilibrium effort choices did not constitute an obvious focal point (e.g. 50) 
and were below the socially efficient level (52.83).  
 
 
 
Table 2 
OLS Regressions Examining the Feedback Hypothesis 
 
Table 2 presents OLS regressions for second stage effort choices in the TF condition.  Clustered standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***. 
 

e 2
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT *** 48.82 (1.97) *** 48.82 (1.97) *** 49.64 (1.49) *** 48.82 (1.97) 
|∆| *** -0.42 (0.05)    
∆ > 0  *** -0.30 (0.05) *** -0.30 (0.05) *** -0.30 (0.05) 
∆ < 0  *** 0.53 (0.05) *** 0.53 (0.05) *** 0.53 (0.05) 
ROUND   -0.10 (0.15) -0.10 (0.15) 
∆ > 0 * ROUND    -0.002 (0.01) 
∆ < 0 * ROUND    0.007 (0.01) 
     
Clusters 8 8 8 8 
N 1440 (full) 1440 (full) 1440 (full) 1440 (full) 
R² 19.11% 23.26% 23.32% 23.39% 
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Table 3 
OLS Regressions Effort PF Condition Stage 2 
 
Table 3 presents OLS regressions for second stage effort choices in the PF condition.  Clustered standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***. 
 

e 2
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT *** 43.06 (1.27) *** 44.30 (1.64) *** 42.07 (1.48) *** 43.52 (1.75) 
|Δ̂ i|
 
*** -0.45 (0.09) ** -0.67 (0.22)   
Δ̂ i > 0
 
  -0.03 (0.22) -0.08 (0.24) 
Δ̂ i < 0
 
  *** 0.53 (0.14) *** 0.97 (0.23) 
     
clusters 8 8 8 8 
n 960 (full) 936 (wins.) 960 (full) 936 (wins.) 
R² 5.52% 3.44% 7.39% 7.15% 
 
 
 
Table 4 
OLS Regressions Effort TF Condition Stage 2 and PF Condition Stage 2 
 
Table 4 presents OLS regressions for second stage effort choices in the TF and PF conditions.  Clustered standard errors are 
reported in brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***. 
 

e 2 ,

e 2
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT *** 48.82 (1.90) *** 48.82 (1.90) *** 48.82 (1.90) *** 48.82 (1.90) 
|Δ̂ i|
 
*** 0.41 (0.05) *** 0.41 (0.05)   
Δ̂ i > 0
 
  *** -0.30 (0.05) *** -0.30 (0.05) 
Δ̂ i < 0
 
  *** 0.53 (0.05) *** 0.53 (0.05) 
|Δ̂ i| * PRINCIPAL
 
-0.04 (0.10) -0.25 (0.22)   
Δ̂ i > 0 * PRINCIPAL
 
  0.28 (0.22) 0.22 (0.23) 
Δ̂ i < 0 * PRINCIPAL
 
  0.001 (0.14) * 0.44 (0.23) 
PRINCIPAL ** -5.76 (2.27) * -4.52 (2.47) ** -6.75 (2.38) ** -5.30 (2.55) 
     
clusters 16 16 16 16 
n 2400 (full) 2376 (wins.) 2400 (full) 2376 (wins.) 
R² 14.02% 13.61% 17.26% 17.57% 
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Table 5 
OLS Regressions of Lying on the Potential Gains from Lying 
 
Table 5 presents OLS regressions for the absolute value of deviations of reports from the truth in the PF condition.  Clustered 
standard errors are reported in brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and 
***. 
 
|Δ̂ i − Δ|
 
(1) (2) (3) 
CONSTANT *** 5.97 (0.84) *** 4.17 (0.56) ** 3.97 (1.31) 
GAIN *** 0.43 (0.01) *** 0.43 (0.01) *** 0.44 (0.02) 
ROUND  * 0.23 (0.10) 0.25 (0.21) 
GAIN * ROUND   -0.00 (0.00) 
    
clusters 8 8 8 
n 960 (full) 960 (full) 960 (full) 
R² 81.18% 81.37% 81.38% 
 
 
 
Table 6 
OLS Regressions of Reported on Actual Output Difference in the PF Condition 
 
Table 6 presents OLS regressions for reported output differences in the PF condition.  Clustered standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***.  
 
Δ̂ i
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT -1.06 (0.87) -1.06 (0.87) -1.06 (0.87) -1.06 (0.87) 
∆ *** 0.12 (0.02) *** 0.16 (0.03) *** 0.12 (0.02) *** 0.16 (0.03) 
∆ * LOWMACH   *** 0.10 (0.02) *** 0.11 (0.02) 
∆ * HIGHMACH   -0.04 (0.02) * -0.04 (0.02) 
∆ * ROUND  -0.004 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.003) 
     
clusters 8 8 8 8 
n 960 (full) 960 (full) 960 (full) 960 (full) 
R² 14.61% 14.93% 15.14% 15.48% 
 
Note: Round and Machiavelli score were also included as non-interaction terms, but the coefficients are never significant and 
therefore omitted from Table 5 
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Table 7 
OLS Regressions Effort Response PF Condition Stage 2 
 
Table 7 presents OLS regressions for second stage effort choices in the PF condition.  Clustered standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***.  
 

e 2
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT ***47.34 (2.55)  *** 48.06 (3.19) *** 50.00 (3.27) *** 49.29 (3.09) 
|Δ̂ i|
 
*** 0.45 (0.09) *** 0.47 (0.10) *** 0.82 (0.16)  
Δ̂ i > 0
 
   -0.18 (0.15) 
Δ̂ i < 0
 
   *** 1.12 (0.16) 
LOW DIFFERENCE  ** -0.99 (0.38) ** -1.26 (0.40) ** -1.18 (0.36) 
ROUND ** -0.56 (0.23) 0.25 (0.34) 0.16 (0.35) 0.21 (0.31) 
     
clusters 8 8 8 8 
n 960 (full) 896 (full) 872 (wins.) 872 (wins.) 
R² 7.21% 8.63% 7.40% 11.32% 
 
Note:  There are 896 (872) observations in the full (winsorized) sample when the lagged variable LOW DIFFERENCE is 
included. Additional results for the full sample are very similar, but are omitted from Table 8 for reasons of conciseness. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
OLS Regressions Effort Response PF Condition Stage 1 
 
Table 8 presents OLS regressions for first stage effort choices in the PF condition.  Clustered standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level is indicated by *, ** and ***. 
 

e 1
 
(1) (2) (3) 
CONSTANT *** 39.13 (1.36) *** 39.63 (1.68) *** 39.53 (1.48) 
LOW DIFFERENCE  ** -1.07 (0.37) ** -2.34 (0.99) 
ROUND * -0.47 (0.21) -0.15 (0.27) -0.25 (0.23) 
    
clusters 8 8 8 
n 960 (full) 896 (full) 896 (full) 
R² 1.65% 3.45% 4.36% 
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Figure 1 
Predicted Effort Levels and Kernel Regression TF Condition Stage 2 
 
Figure 1 presents predicted and actual average effort levels for Stage 2 in the TF condition using Epanechnikov 
Kernel regression. 
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Figure 2 
Predicted and Actual Effort Levels TF & PF Condition Stage 2 
 
Figure 2 presents predicted and actual average effort levels for Stage 2 in the TF and PF conditions using 
Epanechnikov Kernel regressions. 
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Figure 3 
Average Effort Levels in NF, TF and PF Condition Stage 1 
 
Figure 3 presents first-stage average effort levels by round for the NF, TF and PF condition. 
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Figure 4 
Average Effort Levels in NF, TF and PF Condition Stage 2 
 
Figure 4 presents second-stage average effort levels by round for the NF, TF and PF condition. 
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Figure 5 
Actual/Reported Output Difference and Fitted Values in PF Condition 
 
Figure 5 presents actual and reported output difference pairs and fitted values in the PF condition. 
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Figure 6 
Actual/Reported Output Difference and Fitted Values for Subject #24 and #43 
 
Figure 6 presents actual and reported output difference pairs and fitted values in the PF condition for subject #24 and 
#43. 
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Figure 7 
Optimal and Actual Efforts PF Condition Stage 2 
 
Figure 7 presents optimal and actual effort levels for Stage 2 in the PF condition. The optimal effort levels are chosen 
such that an agent chooses effort optimally using the correct posterior distribution of actual output differences for a 
given reported output difference. 
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